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IN THE UTAH COLRT OF APPEALS 
ST ATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff Appellant, Case No 20010772-CA 
v 
TRACY MANUEL VALDEZ, Priority No 2 
Defendant/Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing charges for possession of 
methamphetamine in a drug free zone with a pnor conviction, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 7-8(2 )(a)(i) (1998), possession of paraphernalia in a drug 
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-37a-5( 1) (1998), and 
providing false personal information to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1999), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Ray M Harding, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah Code Ann 
§§ 77-I8a-l(2)(a) (1999) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp 2001) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSLE ON APPEAL \ND 
STANDARD OF \PPELL\TE REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of fact and law in concluding that 
defendant was unlawfully detained by investigating officers' request for his 
identification to allay their acknowledged concern for their safety? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue Underlying fact findings are 
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error " The court's conclusions ot law 
how ev er, are review ed for correctness, allow ing some "measure of discretion" as regards the 
application of legal standards to the facts State v Pena, 869 P 2d 932,935-40 (Utah 1994) 
This issue was preserved in the trial court in the prosecution's response to defendant's 
motion to suppress and at the hearing on the motion to suppress (R. 41, 72.9-11,17, 26-29) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provision is determinative of this case 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Tracy Manuel Valdez, was charged possession of methamphetamine in 
a drug free zone with a pnor conviction, possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, and 
giving false personal information to a peace officer (R. 14). Following a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over on all charges (R. 16-17). The trial court granted 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the case (R. 51-54, 56-57) The 
State timely appealed the trial court's ruling (R 62). The Utah Supreme Court transferred 
the case to this Court (R 70). 
i 
STATEMENT OF THF FACTS 
Preliminary Hearing 
Midday, on 26 February 2001, police went to the home of Monique Young in 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, with a valid warrant for her arrest (R. 71:5, 18). While knocking on 
the door, Officer Robinson heard people in the house (R. 71:5). Some time passed before 
Young answered the door, at which point she was arrested (R. 71:5-6). Because Young \\ as 
wearing boxer shorts, Robinson agreed to her request to put on a pair of pants (R. 71:6). 
Robinson and the officer accompanying him escorted Young back to the bedroom for safety 
reasons (R. 71:6-7, 15). There, Officer Robinson found defendant, wearing a long black 
trench coat, lying' face down on the bed (R. 71:6, 8). Concerned that he could not see 
defendant's hands, Officer Robinson yelled, "Wake up. Let me see your hands," but 
defendant did not respond (R. 71:6). Suspecting that defendant was feigning sleep, Officer 
Robinson shook defendant and the bed, again requesting that defendant "wake up" and show 
his hands (R. 71:16). Immediately after defendant was evidently awake, Officer Robinson 
asked if he had any identification (R. 71:6, 19). Defendant responded negatively (R. 71:6-
7). In response to the officer's further request, defendant identified himself as "Sean Tracv 
Michaels" (R. 71:7). However, as defendant spoke, Officer Robinson overheard Young 
whisper to the other officer that defendant's real name was Tracy Valdez (R. 71:7). 
1
 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing, on which the parties stipulated 
to submit the motion to suppress (R. 72:3-4). 
3 
Officer Robinson then asked dispatch to check "Tracv Valdez" w ith the date ot birth 
defendant had given him (R. 71 7) Dispatch reported back with a valid statewide warrant 
for defendant with a date of birth of 3 December 1961 instead of 4 December 1961, the date 
defendant had provided (R. 71:7-8). Officer Robinson asked again if defendant had any 
identification and this time defendant produced a Utah identification card from his right rear 
pocket (R. 71:8). The name on the card was Tracy Manuel Valdez with a date of birth of 
3 December 1961 (R. 71 8) Officer Robinson handcuffed and arrested defendant on the 
statewide warrant, and for giving false personal information (R. 718) A search of 
defendant's person incident to his arrest yielded methamphetamine and paraphernalia (R 
71:8-11). The arrest took place within one thousand feet of a day-care center and a post 
office (R. 71:11 -12). Defendant also had two prior drug convictions (R. 71:12-13). 
Argument at suppression hearing and ruling 
Following the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to suppress evidence of all 
controlled substances found on his person (R. 32-39).2 Defendant argued that his right to be 
free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was violated because he was subjected to a level two detention without 
2
 Although defendant moved to suppress evidence of contraband found on his 
person, he nowhere argued that as a result of an alleged illegal search and seizure 
evidence supporting the charge of giving false personal information to a peace officer 
should be suppressed. 
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reasonable suspicion as soon as officers attempted to a\\:ikj: . - .,\ -:, 
he relied uii j/ti/i i i Vn^n/f ""I1" Mol ' i , 1 iilil1.1' i 11 nr . .11 ntiin \\}\\ Static v. Ray.WS 
-wu ; , * " 'it ui6 claim inai .*w 'Aai subjected to a ,e\e 
detention, .md v/:*. 1 Johnson, ^O P 2 i ~*1 < Utah ' "~U '- 'teip Mr -^"* h^ cla*^ *Kr*u -
deter/ion v*as unjustified <.< . x . /he prosecution opp* ^ . _,.• . 
anu, v.onse^ueT,r v. 
defendant's authonty w as mirphcubie »R. -w *<j;. l._ , rosecution also argued that, 
notwithstanding anv determination as to the 'eve! of the encounter, the ofiicer s reque*^ r^'ir 
defendant shov^ ujiuo a.... 
Young iiH: • ///e7, JvO U.S. o 2 , 5V S. Ul. 2 u 3 4 ^1^0^ ; , ui.~ Io 
ensure officer satet> ^k. •**, ,-.;- . . , _\2t>-29>. 
The trial court found that the officer's shaking and shouting .*i .;.;.. ... V 
confines of the arrest... 
pp- - **~ ci >  action^ vvcic justifiable, a, .east until the) .ou.u - ^ 
defendant z *ML::JLZ -sr.u 'c - [sic] they were in no danger" i'3 c?^ Beyond that point, 
r)etendant asserted h his motion to suppress that his claims were based on both 
the I rtah and the United States Uonstimtions ( R 39). Howe\er. defendant relied in the 
tnal court exclusively on cases decided ^nK under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution (R. 33-36). See, e.g , .v ;:L V Ptitnun. ^39 P 2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam), State v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 (Utah \ r p 2' "<•». </vd V.:;L <. 'ahnson* 805 P.2d 761 
(Utah 1991),. I herefore, this Court should ; •. :b analysis r-^  rou::n Amendment 
jurisprudence. See State v. Dans. 9"2 P 2d 3^v 3U2 •: M.n ,;-)0*3 (declining to consider 
alternate state constitutional cl.i.r- - : urp^rted h\ e^r\H ue icja1 analysis). 
however, the court concluded the detention should ha\e ended (R. 52) In support, the court 
relied on Johnson, ruling that the detention to ask defendant's name in this case was 
analogous to the improperly extended level two stop in that case (R. 52). Consequently, the 
court granted defendant's motion to suppress (R. 51). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court correctly concluded that the officers had a reasonable concern for their 
safety when they encountered defendant acting suspiciously while they were executing an 
arrest warrant in private premises. However, the court erroneously found that the officers' 
safety concern abated when defendant showed them his hands. The court also failed to 
recognize that under the circumstances of the encounter and governing law, the officers 
were fully justified in either asking or demanding defendant identify himself where they 
were reasonably concerned for their safety. As a consequence of its erroneous factual 
findings, the court also arrived at incorrect legal conclusions in determining that the 
investigating officers unjustifiably expanded the scope of defendant's detention. 
Further, even if the officers unjustifiably believed that defendant might be armed and 
dangerous, they were justified in either asking or demanding that defendant identify himself 
during a search incident to the arrest of defendant's companion. In the suspicious 
circumstances of their encounter with defendant, such request or demand was a justifiable, 
minimal intrusion within the balancing of interests entailed by any search or seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT F
 : \II ED TO RECOGNIZE THAT OFFICERS 
REASONABLY CONCERNED FOR THEIR SAFETY " F » i 
AITHORIZED TO ASK DEFENDANT TO IDENTIFY HiMSLLt-
EVEN IF THE OFFICER UNREASONABLE BELIEVED 
DEFENDAN i i u BE ARMED AND DANGEROUS, HIS REQUFM 
FOR DEFENDANTS NAME WA^ \ HMIFIABLY MINIM 
INTRUSION GIVEN THE CIRCL 1 \Nf ESOFTHE FNCOIN U R 
Following jhciring rn defendants motion to suppress *y. deiKe, ;ne indlc-Hir ^ "n-' 
that >. • .,v.j w(;i,c( .. .v..... . -
-
 r>
 - iui ineir^drer,v r-* "j-:ifv their awakening defendant and 
directing his mov ements (Ruung, R. 5<~>-: i at -"2, attached at Addendum A I However, the 
court alsr> found that the officers no loneer. ^; ... concern alter detendan; -;, - , 
his nanc : ' * . * ,-
extended by a 'warrants check. (R. 52). Consequently, the trial court concluded that the 
officers exceeded the scope of defendant' - ;a^ifiahle detention it the point they asked for 
his name and by subsequently requesting a f utile warrants check i R ','"'). 
1 • .5 no record support t or the 
tnal court's factual findings that defendant displayed his hands, that the officers con^Lr*> 
for their safety were allayed before defendant was arrested, or that me> condL^.a i . ,. 
warrants check. 
,
 :\ s a consequence of its factual errors, the trial court incorrectly concluded that 
Officer Robinson's request for defendant's name, followed by the officer's discovery that 
defendant had giv en him false information, improperly expanded the scope of his detention 
beyond the officers' reasonable concern for their safety (R. 52). The court's conclusion, 
how ev er, is contrary to well established law authorizing police officers to ask for a suspect' s 
identification during an investigative detention justified by a reasonable concern for the 
officers' safety, as in this case. Moreover, the court misapplied governing authonty in 
concluding that defendant was unjustifiably detained. Finally, even if the officer lacked a 
reasonable concern for his safety, asking defendant his name was a justifiably minimal 
intrusion to protect himself incident to the arrest of defendant's companion. 
A. The trial properly found that officers had a reasonable 
concern for their safety upon first encountering defendant 
In the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that police 
officers, for their protection, were authonzed to conduct a limited search of persons 
reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 92 S Ct 
1868, 1883(1968). See State v Rochell, 850 P 2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing 
authonty to "pat down," or "frisk" when "speci fie and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion") (quoting Tern, 
392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). "'The officer need not be absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger/" State \ 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) (quoting Terry, 392 U S. at 27, 92 S Ct at 1883) 
Here, the tnal court correctly concluded that the officers had reasonable concern for 
8 
their safety at the beginning of their engagement with detendam I he olticers were 
executing a valid arrest warrant on \ . 
71 , |V| |mni|,'li1ilrl\ IH'I-MI- .'ntrnnn the premises. Officer Robinson heard "pe-. :• *; 
within the house, after which some time passed before \ oung answered the door ( H 
6). Accompanying Young back to her bedroom. Officer Rotun^n i..*., no aetenda(\t, wearing 
a long b JL^\ ,r. ; 
mnl'.lj' • "' -nca ior his safely, Otficer Robinson repeatedh attempted to :ou:>c 
defendant while asking defendant to show his hands >R "1 61 When defendant fai1:J ^ 
respond, the officer suspected that deiendant was feigning MCU 
"I ! le ti lal :c i u: l: i: ecogi lize :i tl i< ' * i urie^i 
wai rant and confronting an unknown person ...iv, .%a« acting eva^ivei), had a reasonable 
concern that defendant might be armed and dangerous, which justified defendant - nr.M 
detention (R \2, s4i Ve State < i h>ne\, *' |J •' l l , u ' IMUJJJ ,
 ( | |,|[, , 
•L'.» " tigating officer reasonably believed that 
individual, suspected of dealing narcotics dn^i -. h_ ••.."• -el}' removed something fr^m car 
se.it ^hen forced, might be armed and dangerous): State \ \ Leonard, 6l$ P - * ! -
/["i tan ipp. i'1"*!"" mi.i" ' i i 'I'M i*'i,,r l i i J i ' i < nihil1 in il ihlt* i i »iK em ft" 'heir 
*. ^ u^.i .n i w\p,,w.., the trial court s conclusion, that ki,[ci]fiei the officers could 
^ .;c:endanfs hands and new [sic] they were in no danger, the detention should have 
or..leu" ' R 52 • emphasis added), implicitly recognized that defendant was law fully 
detained out LI a concern tor officer safety before they could see his hands. 
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safety following chase of suspected narcotics dealer who made evasive driving maneuvers 
and hand movements and who gave police information inconsistent from his companion), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (suspect properly ordered to lie on the floor when suspect had disobeyed police 
commands to raise his hands and had made furtive gestures); State v. Horace, 28 P.3d 753, 
758-59 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (finding reasonable basis for frisk of driver's companion 
wearing bulky zippered jacket and who might have feigned detachment from driver's 
extensive movements suggesting the hiding of a weapon). 
However, the court also found that the officers no longer had such concern after 
defendant showed them his hands and they knew they were in no danger and that 
defendant's detention was further extended by a futile warrants check. (R. 52). These 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
B. The trial court clearly erred in finding that the officers knew 
they were no longer in danger after defendant showed his 
hands and that they conducted a futile warrants check; rather, 
the record shows that defendant's continued detention was justified. 
The trial court's factual findings, that officer Robinson had no concern for his safety 
after he saw defendant's hands and that the officers conducted a futile warrants check, are 
clearly erroneous. 
"A trial court's factual findings will not be reversed absent clear error.,, State v 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, <[60,28 P.3d 1278 (citations omitted). To demonstrate that a finding 
of fact is clearly erroneous, the complaining party "must first marshal all the evidence that 
10 
supports the trial court's findings. \fte r rr,u'>hahng the supportive evidence, the appellant 
then must show that, even when v ie\\ ing the cv idenu: in ,i huhr morr \,\\ ornbW !•» ill*' n i,il 
...
 t t j i e t r i a[ C0UIfs flndmu;- SLUC v. 
Gamblin, 2U0U L \ -r-i, V / .1—, * ; \Jd 1 u b (Citatiuns omated). 
The v\\ > i.-t found *' J4 "Vfter *ue officers cnuui -CL i-etendant 5 '^ru;- . , 
[k]ne*>\ they were in no danger t; . „ 
I he onh '" • 1 v idence : n u i me ti lal court's 'finding that the otricers ^ouiu _ c 
defendant's hands was Officer Robinson's testimony, "that [at the point the officer made his 
last request to see defendant'" hanu- defendant M . »; aets up and wake^ 1/* 
( • lefenddni 
s • * uiiicer Robinson or did anything else to allay the officer sconce-T- r r 
his safety (R. 52). .Also, there is no ev idence that either officer knew he was no !oneer ;n 
danger for any reason Ralhei, the circumstances ol the ciiLountc 1 u\ ngni/H h I I 
c- '- ^ • . --y at me outlet, wire 
r . r nsiealh ^oiciousanujuouiieddeiciidant'a -onLnucd detention The record indi^te-
that 'Ahile executing the a-* -' warrant f^r iefendant's compandor *K- ;- \*e vu-id 
In- '. in I lun I-, ill iviprnse to the officer's request, a reasonably prudent police of fleer 
would still hav e entertained a reasonable belief U'LM defendant might have been i n r e i ~nd 
dangerous. Upon engaging defenaaf... ulcers <im^ . became^- . . . . . i as 
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feigning sleep in the middle of the day, while wearing a substantial coat capable of readily 
concealing a weapon, all before he had been patted down or identified (R. 71:6, 16). 
As a matter of law and common sense, the mere display of a suspect's hands in such 
circumstances cannot circumscribe an investigative detention intended to relieve an officer's 
concern for his safety when the officer is authorized under Terry to also frisk a suspect's 
clothes for a weapon. See State v. Potter, 863 P 2d 40, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("There 
is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists. Rather, courts must look 
at the totality of the circumstances.") (citation omitted). Indeed, the officer's request for 
defendant's identification, typically requested as part of an investigative detention based on 
officer safety, indicates that Officer Robinson had not fully allayed his and his fellow 
officer's concerns for their safety. 
Additionally, in support of its conclusion that defendant was subjected to undue 
detention after Officer Robinson asked for his name, the court made another finding, stating, 
"[i]t is worthy of note that the officers also ran a warrant check on the name Defendant gave 
them, although the check would not reveal any information that would establish Defendant' s 
identity" (R. 52). In fact, Officer Robinson asked dispatch to check the name "Tracy 
Valdez," the name Young whispered and which correctly identified defendant and 
immediately led to the discovery of an outstanding warrant (R. 71:7-8). In sum, the trial 
court erroneously found that Officer Robinson knew he was no longer in danger after 
defendant showed him his hands and that defendant's detention was extended by a futile 
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warrants check. These clearly erroneous findings were centra!.... ZK :nal court s conclusi* ^ n 
of law that the oincers improperly euentletl defend nit ili inilnni mi ihe pnini ilu^ i i -M 
f z - i. 
C. A request for identification is an intrinsic part of an 
investigative detention based on concet n foi officer safety 
As a consequence of its factual ei i 01 s, the ti ial court incoi r. 
(Jt: _,:* • • •« t for defet iclai: it s i tai i ic follow ;!l^ 'ed b) - the officer s discover; -A\ai 
C-^ • z ~* u zl _ ven him false information, improperly extended his le\c'l z w d^em..-- z 
52). The court ^om. iu-ion ; z ^ -,-\ ..-r [,, zntrary to well established law authorizing police 
officers to a ^ z>r a suspe„i -
 taenutuaz .. . i i i u kzh/niinn niZitltM lz i 
As noted in the preceding section, police officers, for their protection, are authonzed 
to conduct a limited search of persons reasonably believ id to z^ an^cd and dangerous. See 
Tem\ S^l I ,h al J , ' ' i S il I •sds In i n llii I iijnil iinijilii i lh \\\ otJXii/n) th il p,uT 1 in 
*  \-v:-•n.iK:y detained on suspicion or committing a crime and 
being dangerous .-.^ to a*k tor idczzf, ,;!..*• V ^ : r .S . at 2$. SS S. Cr .it ! ^ ? 
Upholding the officer's detaining suspects m rhat case ihc ( ouit no 
^inpeci> ] lespuiist: in In , III iiliii ill nun HIITIM - IMP" It i 111 «;el f as a police officer, and asking 
tfteir names s e r v e c i t0 dispel that reasonable belief Lthat the suspect were armed]." Id. 
(emphasisadded" '"rzjmerable cases following TV^rvhaveimpIiLi .v recognized inai police 
officers may routine*;* request a suspe^ ... . - • z • ;z 
v Leoncud* 825 P 2d 664, 668 n 4 (Ltah App 1991) (approving investigation to discover 
name of individual reasonably suspected of dealing narcotics), Moore v State, 55 S \V 3d 
652, 655 (Tex Cnm. App. 2001) ("An investigative detention is a temporary and narrowIv 
tailored mv estigation directed at determining a person's identity or maintaining the status quo 
while officers obtain more information ") (citation omitted) 
In Adams v Williams, a case in which the an officer was held to have reasonably 
reached into the suspect's car to retneve a gun based on an informant's tip in a level two 
stop, the United States Supreme Court made explicit what it had left implicit in Terry * \ 
bnef stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identm or to maintain the 
status quo momentanly while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light 
of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams v Williams, 407 U S. 143, 146, 92 S 
Ct. 1921, 1923 (citing Terry, 392 U S. at 23, 88 S Ct. at 1881) (emphasis added).5 
In cases similar to this one, courts have either implicitly or explicitly recognized that 
an officer, reasonably concerned for his safety, may either request or even demand that a 
detainee identify himself. In United States v Murdock, police entered an apparently 
There are a vanety of reasons for identifying a detainee If an initial 
investigation proves inconclusive and the detained suspect later commits cnme, he will be 
almost impossible to locate if he was released without having been identified See 4 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9 5(g) (3rd ed 1996) 
("Without even that bit of information, subsequent apprehension of the released suspect, 
if he is later shown to have perpetrated the suspected cnme or some other offense, will 
usually be impossible.") (citing President's Commission of Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice Task Force Report, Science and Technology 8 (1967)) 
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unoccupied house at night, guns drawn, in response to a possible burglar* I 'M'/U/1 .Vd/vv W 
A/.. 
/ ,//< >mtc i Counn- af Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2000). Entering the bedroom, 
they found Murdock lying on the bed beneath a blanket. Id. Because defendant was covered. 
'he officers demanded du. - ^ ^ -.., - . * :;ai;d 
:--: .. **"' • • *.,-v/'dihe biankeiaiiu 
found Murdock iuuj dressed. Id. On these facts, including Murdock1 s refusal, to identify 
f Y*T "mrcd States Couit .*f \rpeaU f^ r the \ inth r :rci:it approved a pat down u ; 
l e d ) * d , ^ i - . „ v ,
 v 
A.^-d 5o9 ^ N . J . 5upc t . LL i > 5 i / , u^uviu 
the search oi the dcieadaiit, :casonabl> detained in J „rm . a" <mestigation. A/ at 5"! The 
investigation followed the arrest of Wilcox's companion, for whose person, premises,, and 
automobile a searc: ^ t r ;.: . isdjcd up< n iiilonn.iliori 1'h.Ji lit," w.is imnlwd in iln.1 
duMI iiit m ' fter the police found the drugs, they approached Wilcox. 
who had arrived with his companion in the auto identified in the warrant, and asked him for 
identification. Id. Wilcox immediately appeared nervous and
 r a . , L \ 
\ t ' -< * ~ > *u.. u,,jge o[ a vvallet 
in Vv doox's pants and asked Wilcox if he had any identification in ir-e v\ allet *.;' \ — >r: 
as Wilcox removed the wallet and thumbed through it, the officer noised an .d -^- . ^tirm 
for someoru. n, knew was in |ail. J < M : "IIKCI 'I ton d-; • 
arrested him Id The court concluded that '"the brief detention of defendant to ascertain hib 
identity was a reasonable police investigatory procedure . . ." Id. 
\n State v Flynn, 285 N.W.2d710(Wis. 1979), cert denied. 449 U.S. 846, 101 S. Ct. 
130(1980), the court approved not merely a detention, but a search of a suspect to determine 
his identity, when he refused to cooperate in circumstances reasonably giving nse to a 
concern for officer safety. Id. at 718-19. Relying, in part, on state law allowing a police 
officer to demand the name and address of a person reasonably suspected of committing a 
crime, and Terry* and Adams, the court stated, "Indeed, unless the officer is entitled to at least 
ascertain the identity of the suspect, the right to stop him can serve no useful purpose at all." 
Id. at 716.6 The court reasoned that otherwise a non-complying suspect could readily thw art 
any police investigation. Id. at 716, 718. Balancing the need to discover Flynn's identity 
against his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, the court found that the 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. § 11-IAS (1999) ("A peace officer may stop any person in 
a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the 
act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions."); Oliver v Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1188-90 
(10th Cir. 2000) (concluding officer entitled to qualified immunity in arresting motorist 
reasonably suspected of criminal activity under state statute criminalizing the interference 
with a lawful detention, where suspect refused to identify himself following police 
request under section 77-7-15, Terry and Williams). See also United States v Trimble, 
986 F 2d 394, 397-98 (10th Cir.) (where a passenger in a car lawfully stopped by the 
police attempted to leave the area over objection of police officer, court held uwhen [the 
passenger] proceeded to leave the scene of the stop, [the officer] was entitled to detain 
him for purposes of identification in order to ascertain * what's going on/" and asserted 
%tsuch action was in keeping with good police work, and the intrusion was minimal.") 
(citation omitted), cert, denied, 508 U S. 965, 113 S Ct. 2943 (1993). 
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tnsk v\ as undertaken \\ ithout intent to harass and only to locate some identification and w a* 
therefore, reasonable Id at 718-19 Recognizing that the balancing of interests in search 
and seizure must necessarily be "flexible," the court concluded, **the scope of the search \\ as 
no broader than was necessary to obtain the information, the need for which justified the 
intrusion in the first place " Id See also Tuohx v State, 776 So 2d 896, 899 (Ala Cnm 
App 1999) (holding seizure of credit card for purposes of identification within the scope ot 
investigative detention and asserting, w*[^ ]e are aware of no constitutional proscription 
against asking an individual stopped pursuant to Tern to identify himself) 
Even on less than reasonable suspicion that the suspect was potentially dangerous, 
officers might require the detainee's name to properly execute a warrant. In Michigan \ 
Summers, the Court held that a search warrant for a house carries with it the authority to 
detain its occupants until the search is completed. Id, 452 U S 692, 705, 101 S Ct 2587, 
2595 (1981). It would be absurd to think that the officers in Summers could not have asked 
the occupant of the house, legitimately detained incident to the execution of a search warrant, 
his name to determine that he was the home owner and thereby capable of assisting police 
officers in the search. 
In this case, officers would readily have wanted to identify defendant on the chance 
that his name might readily identify him as dangerous Additionally, defendant's identity 
w ould have helped establish his connection w ith Ms Young or his familiarity w ith the home, 
information bearing on his potential for danger 
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Moreover, common sense dictates that it an officer is justified in patting down a 
suspect, then he is also authorized in undertaking the less intrusive investigation of asking 
for identification. See 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure at § 9 5(a) (indicating that Tetn 
strongly suggests that some investigation should be conducted before a suspect is subjected 
to the intrusion of a fnsk). Cf State v HalL 1997 WL 528318 (Del Super ) (concluding 
under state statute that officers were required first to inquire as to suspect's name before 
conducting a pat down), see also Utah Code Ann § 77-7-15 (1999) ("A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions."). 
In this case, Officer Robinson merely asked defendant for his identification, a request 
that defendant apparently voluntanly acceded to. That request was within the scope of 
defendant's detention, based on the officers' reasonable concern for their safety In sum, 
having concluded that the officers properly detained defendant out of a concern for their 
safety upon discovenng him in suspicious circumstances while executing a valid arrest 
warrant, and having erroneously concluded that defendant's responses to Officer Robinson s 
inquines and directions allayed the officers' concern for their safety, the tnal court 
incorrectly concluded that defendant was improperly detained when officers asked him his 
name 
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D. The trial court incorrectly concluded that defendant was improperly 
detained v\hen the investigating officer asked for his identification. 
Based on its erroneous findings of fact, the trial court incorrectly concluded that 
defendant w as improperly detained bevond the point he show ed Officer Robinson his hands 
and the officers knew they were no longer in danger (R 52) The trial court exacerbated its 
incorrect conclusion by erroneously assuming that the detention was unnecessarily 
prolonged by the officers' conducting a futile warrants check (R 52) 
"[T]he Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, it forbids only 
'unreasonable searches and seizures "* Statex Rodnguez-Lopi,954P 2d 1290, 1292 (Ltah 
App 1998) (citing the Fourth Amendment to the Lnited States Constitution and Tern, 392 
US at 9, 88 S Ct at 1873 (1968)). 'Therefore, 'to determine whether a search or seizure 
is constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual inquiry (1) Was the police officer's action 
'justified at its inception'9 and (2) Was the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place9'" Id (citations omitted) 
"[T]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by1 the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible " Statev Hansen, 2000 UT \pp353, 
^11, 17 P 3d 1135 (citing State v Johnson, 805 P 2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)) (quoting Tetn, 
392 U S at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop " Florida v Roxer 460 
US 491, 500 (1983) (citations omitted) "Similarly, the investigative methods emploved 
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer * 
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suspicion in a short period of time " Id 
In finding that defendant had already been unduly detained at the point at which. 
according to the trial court, defendant showed his hands and the officers knew they were no 
longer in danger, the trial court incorrectly applied Johnson In Johnson, the defendant w as 
a passenger in a car stopped for an equipment violation. Id 805 P 2d at 762. The name on 
the driver's license was not the name of the registered owner, which the officer had checked 
before stopping the car Id Also, the driver was unable to produce the registration Id 
Reasoning on these facts that the car might be stolen, the officer asked Johnson tor 
identification. Id Johnson denied having a driver's license or any identification, but did 
give the officer her name and date of birth. Id Without any questioning to allay his belief 
that the car might be stolen and without any information that the car was stolen, the officer 
returned to his patrol car and ran a warrants check on both occupants. Id. The check 
revealed that Johnson had outstanding warrants Id A search of her backpack uncovered 
drugs. Id 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the officer unreasonably detained the passenger 
on suspicion that the car was stolen just because neither occupant owned the car or could 
produce a registration certificate Id at 764 The court also noted that the officer failed to 
ask the driver and Johnson any questions that might have alleviated his suspicion that the 
car had been stolen. Id. The court held that gi\ en "the paucity of facts available to him, the 
officer's detention of the passenger beyond what was reasonably related in scope to the 
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traffic stop was not justified by an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a 
crime." Id. 
The trial court misapplied Johnson by concluding that the scope of defendant's 
detention was similarly unjustifiably expanded (R. 52). Unlike the officer in Johnson who 
never had sufficient facts concerning a possible car theft to justify further detention. Officer 
Robinson had observed defendant acting suspiciously at virtually the same time that he 
asked defendant for identification, behavior which the court found sufficient justification 
for detaining defendant out of a concern for safety (R. 71:6, 16). Further, Johnson did not 
decry the officer's asking the passenger for identification. Instead, the court criticized the 
officer's expanding the scope of the detention by initiating a warrants check without first 
discovering facts that might or might not have justified the deeper intrusion of a warrants 
check. Specifically, the court stated: 
[T]he leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to 
running a warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference 
from specific and articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to 
support an as yet "inchoate and unparticulanzed suspicion or 'hunch.'" 
Id. at 764 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883). 
In contradistinction to the officer's action in Johnson, Officer Robinson ran a check 
on defendant's identification only after defendant gav e him the name *4Sean Tracy Michaels" 
and after Young immediately whispered that his name was really 'Tracy Valdez" (R. 71 7). 
As Terry, Williams, and their countless progeny, including Johnson, assert, asking a 
defendant for identification in circumstances justifying at least a brief detention "ma\ be 
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most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." See Williams, 40" 
U S. at 146, 92 S. Ct. at 1923 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80) 
Moreover, Officer Robinson's request for defendant's name, defendant's response, the 
revelation that defendant's response was probably false, and the officer's confirmation of 
the falsity was evidently an unbroken, rapid chain of events. Further, the testimony indicates 
that the officer's request for defendant's name followed immediately upon defendant's 
suspicious awakening and was plainly part of the officer's efficient effort to either confirm 
or dispel his concerns for his safety (R. 71:6, 16). Thus, the trial court's erroneous finding, 
that the officers unnecessarily prolonged the detention by running a futile warrants check 
on the name "Sean Tracy Michaels," rather than "Tracy Valdez," highlights its mistaken 
application of Johnson (R. 52). 
E. Even if the officer unreasonably believed defendant to be 
armed and dangerous, his request for defendant's name was a 
justifiably minimal intrusion given the circumstances of the encounter. 
'The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's 
personal security:" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09,98 S. Ct. 33, 332 (1997) 
(per curiam) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878). "Reasonableness, of course, 
depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.'" Id. at 109, 98 S. Ct. at 332 
(quoting United States v Brignoni-Ponce. All U S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578 (1975)) 
7? 
"Terry and its progeny indicate an increasing trend to slant the balance of pn\ ac> 
rights versus safety interests in favor of the police as long as the intrusion is limited and 
reasonable/' State v. Lacy, 468 S.E.d 719, 731 (W. Va. 1996). "What may have raised 
judicial e>ebro\vs at the time the Terry decision was issued regarding police safety has 
become commonplace in advance sheets today." Id. "While it was once considered 
necessary . . . for a law enforcement officer to be 'justified in believing that the individual 
whose suspicious behavior he [or she] is investigating . . . is armed and presently dangerous 
to the officer/ (emphasis added), it now suffices, in appropnate circumstances, for the officer 
to be justified in believing that the individual might be armed and dangerous . . . . This 
development is a product of the times/' United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 304, 306 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S. Ct. at 1881). "[I]n 
judging the reasonableness of the actions of the anesting officer, the circumstances are to be 
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by 
his experience and training/' Cousart v. United States, 618 A.2d 96,100 (D.C. Cir. 1992 (en 
banc) (citations omitted), cert denied, 507 U.S. 1042, 113 S. Ct. 1878 (1993). 
Even if the circumstances of this case showed only a marginal basis for detaining 
defendant, Officer Robinson's immediate request for defendant's identification when 
defendant was finally roused was justifiable as a "de minimus" intrusion. In Womack v. 
United States, m A.2d603 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1156, 117 S. Ct. 1097 
(1993), the court stated: "The use in the Fourth Amendment of the adjective 'unreasonable1 
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imports a command of proportionality to that Amendment's jurisprudence The greater the 
restriction on the seized individual's liberty, the more substantial the justification for such 
a restriction must be A lesser intrusion, on the other hand, requires a correspondingly lesser 
showing " Id at 608 (citations omitted) 
Assuming, arguendo, that the circumstances of the officers' confrontation with 
defendant did not give rise to a reasonable belief that defendant was armed and dangerous 
Officer Robinson's request, or even insistence, that defendant identify himself did not \ lolate 
defendant's Fourth Amendment nghts As the prosecution correctly argued, under Cfumel 
v California, 395 U S 752, 89 S Ct 2034(1969)), the officers were entitled to take at least 
minimal precautions to protect themselves from possible danger incident to Ms Young's 
arrest, apart from any particularized danger posed by defendant (R. 71 10-11, 26-27) 
"'A contemporaneous, warrantless search of the area within an arrestee's immediate 
control is permissible for the purpose of recovenng weapons the arrestee might reach, or to 
prevent concealment or destruction of evidence of the enme.'" State v Gallegos, 967 P 2d 
973, 978 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v Harrison, 805 P 2d 769, 784 (Utah App 199 i) 
(citing Chimel, 395 U S. at 763, 89 S Ct at 2040) "An arresting officer may, without a 
warrant, lawfully search the area surrounding the person he or she is arresting if (1) the 
arrest is lawful, (2) the search is of the area within the arrestee's immediate control, and (3) 
the search is conducted contemporaneously to the arrest[ ]" Id (citations omitted) 
"'Custodial arrests are often dangerous, the police must act decisively and cannot be 
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expected to make punctilious judgments regarding what is within and what is just be>ond the 
arrestee's grasp/" Id. at 979 (quoting United States v Bennett, 908 F 2d 189, 193 (7lh Cir 
1990)). 
Although the search in Gallegos, did not involve the arrestee's companions, as in this 
case, this Court recognized that circumstance Id at 980 n.5 (citing Bennett, 908 F 2d at 193) 
(upholding mattress search where "officers reasonably feared that someone else was going 
to come to the room who knew where the other weapons were or that the defendants would 
position themselv es to take adv antage of any hidden weapons or instrumentalities") See also 
United States v Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971) (providing for the automatic 
frisk of an arrestee's companions without particular, individualized suspicion and asserting, 
"[i]t is inconceivable that a peace officer effecting a lawful arrest of an occupant of a vehicle 
must expose himself to a shot m the back from defendant's associate because he cannot, on 
the spot, make the nice distinction between whether the other is a companion in cnme or a 
social acquaintance'). Cf. Maryland v Buie 494 U S. 325, 334, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 
(1990) (holding that during a protective sweep "as an incident to the arrest the officers could, 
as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets 
and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be 
immediately launched") (emphasis added). 
Officer Robinson's request or demand for defendant's name was fully justified even 
if he lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain defendant on the belief that defendant 
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was armed and dangerous. Under Terry and Williams, an officer may frisk and detain a 
suspect to obtain identification on reasonable suspicion that his safety is threatened. In such 
circumstances, as argued in section C, a request, or even demand, for identification is still 
less an intrusion than a frisk. However, if incident to the arrest of the suspect's companion 
a police officer may search an arrestee's companion on less than reasonable suspicion that 
he is involved in criminal activity or poses an imminent danger, the officer's mere request 
or demand for identification, a much lesser intrusion on a person's privacy, is still more 
justifiable in the balancing of Fourth Amendment interests. 
In the circumstances of this case, Officer Robinson was fully authorized to request or 
demand defendant's name. At the time the officers executed the arrest warrant, defendant 
lay on a bed in a trench coat in Ms. Young's bedroom, apparently in close proximity to her 
(R. 71:6). In what Officer Robinson believed to be a subterfuge in feigning sleep at midday, 
defendant failed to respond to the officer's attempts to awaken him (R. 71:6, 16). The trial 
court found these actions gave weight to the officer's expressed concern for his safety and 
determined that defendant was reasonably detained at the outset (R. 52). As discussed in 
section C, above, defendant's detention was still justified when Officer Robinson asked to 
see his identification. However, unlike the officers in Flynn, which upheld a search of 
defendant's for identification, Officer Robinson did not search defendant for his 
identification. Rather, the officer asked, or, at most, demanded, defendant provide 
identification (R. 71:6). See People v. Long, 234 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
26 
(upholding demand, as opposed to search, for identification of suspect reasonabiv detained 
and making suspicions movements and observing, ~[m]easured against the obvious and 
substantial need for police recording the identity of a person suspected of having committed 
a crime, we find reasonable the minimal intrusion involved here in requiring the production 
of identification"). 
There is no evidence to suggest that Officer Robinson would hav e searched defendant 
for identification. Instead, when defendant immediately identified himself as "Sean Trac> 
Michaels/' the officer fortuitously discovered that defendant had probably identified himselt 
falsely, which justifiably then led to the officer's identification check and the discovery of 
defendant's outstanding warrant. Indeed, the officer selected the least intrusive means to 
dispel concerns for his safety. Balanced against the officers' concerns for their safety, the 
intrusion, if at all, in asking defendant for his identification, was minimal and within the 
purview of a valid search incident to arrest 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the tnal court's granting of defendant's motion to suppress evidence and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
r* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of March, 2002 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
/ KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
Q fSrU a i C ,^ , s t n c , C o^ of Utah County. State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTrUUKl - ^ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TRACY MANUEL VALDEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 011400986 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being 
fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
RULING 
On February 26, 2001, Officer Bryan Robinson went to the home of Monique Young in 
Pleasant Grove with a valid warrant for her arrest. She answered the door wearing boxer shorts 
and asked to put on a pair of pants. The officer agreed and escorted her back to the bedroom. 
There the officer noticed a male lying face down on the bed. The man was evidently asleep 
because Officer Robinson had to shake him and yell at him for the man to wake up. Officer 
Robinson was concerned that he could not see the man's hands. After the man awoke, Officer 
Robinson asked him for his identification, which the man stated he did not have. The officer then 
asked the man for his name and birth date. The man responded with the name of Sean Tracy 
Michaels. Officer Robinson ran a warrants and an NCI check on that name. Officer Robinson 
had also overheard Monique Young whispering to the assisting officer after the Defendant had 
given the name of Sean Tracy Michaels that the man's true name was Tracy Valdez. Officer 
Robinson ran a warrants check on that name as well. The warrants checks turned up a valid 
warrant for Tracy Valdez. A search incident to arrest turned up methamphetamine on the person 
of the Defendant. 
Defendant argues that this situation is similar to the one faced by the passenger-defendant 
in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). In Johnson, an officer pulled over a car with 
faulty brake lights. The officer noticed that the name on license was not that of the registered 
owner. Suspecting the car might be stolen, the officer asked for the name and birth date of the 
passenger and then ran a warrants check on the driver and passenger. The Court ruled that 
the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a 
warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific 
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.1" 
Id at 764. 
The State here argues that this case is distinguishable in that Johnson was a level two stop 
and the current Defendant was only subjected to a level one encounter until reasonable suspicion 
to detain him had arisen. This Court disagrees. 
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the public: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed." 
A level one encounter uis a voluntary encounter where a citizen may 
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." State v Jackson, 
805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); accord Bfian, 869 P.2d at 986 ('"[A] 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police 
officer merely approaches an individual on the street and questions him, if the 
person is willing to listen."1) (citation omitted). "As long as the person 'remains free 
to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that 
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some 
particularized and objective justification.'" 
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With a level two stop, however, the person is seized for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, "when the officer ,Hby means of physical force or show of 
authority has in some way restrained the libertym of a person." Hence, a level one 
encounter becomes a level two stop and Ma seizure under the fourth amendment 
occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe 
he or she is not free to leave.H This is true Heven if the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention brief" 
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." 
Salt Lake Citv v Rav. 998 P 2d 274, 277 (Utah App 2000) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the officers had exceeded a level one encounter before the questioning 
began. The testimony was that the Defendant was shouted at and physically shaken by an officer 
before any questioning began. The encounter occurred not on a public street but in a private 
bedroom with two officers present. The officers already had someone in custody. A reasonable 
person in that situation would not have felt at liberty to disregard the officer's question or walk 
away. 
After the officers could see Defendants hands and new they were in no danger, the 
detention should have ended. 
The length and scope of the detention must be u< strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible/9 
State v Johnson 805 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1991) While Monique Young's statement may have 
given rise to an articulable suspicion that Defendant had given the officers false information, the 
Defendant had already been improperly detained at that point. It is worthy of note that the 
officers also ran a warrant check on the name Defendant gave them, although the check would 
not reveal any information that would establish Defendant's identity. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED. 
DATED this .2_j£fday of July, 2001 
RAY M. HARDING', 
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